Whither China? Reform and economic integration among Chinese regions by Fidrmuc, J et al.
Department of  
Economics and Finance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Working Paper No. 13-11 
 http://www.brunel.ac.uk/economics 
 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
s 
a
n
d
 F
in
a
n
ce
 W
o
rk
in
g
 P
a
p
e
r 
S
e
ri
e
s 
Jan Fidrmuc, Jarko Fidrmuc and Shuo Huang 
 
Whither China? Reform and Economic 
Integration among Chinese Regions  
 
May 2013 
Whither China? Reform and Economic Integration among
Chinese Regions
Jan Fidrmuca;d;e, Jarko Fidrmucb;d and Shuo Huangc
aDepartment of Economics and CEDI, Brunel University
bZeppelin University Friedrichshafen
cSouthwest University of Finance and Economics
dCESIfo Munich
eInstitute of Economic Studies, Charles University
May 2, 2013
Abstract
This paper investigates the changing nature of economic integration in China. Speci-
cally, we consider business-cycle synchronization (correlation of demand and supply shocks)
among Chinese provinces during the period 1955-2007. We nd that the symmetry of sup-
ply shocks has declined after the liberalization initiated in 1978. In contrast, the correlation
of demand shocks has increased during the same period. We then seek to explain these
correlations by relating them to factors that proxy for interprovincial trade and vulner-
ability of regions to idiosyncratic shocks. Interprovincial trade and similarity in factor
endowments tend to make shocks more symmetric. Surprisingly, foreign trade and inward
FDI have little e¤ect on the symmetry of shocks.
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1 Introduction
Since 1978, China has been undertaking a gradual and largely steady liberalization. The
changes were especially profound in the economic sphere although, lately, they have extended
also to the political domain. The three decades of economic liberalization have had far-reaching
e¤ects on the Chinese economy and society. Most of the changes have been for the better:
China has been able to maintain a high rate of growth, recently becoming the second largest
economy in the world. Yet, the benets of this expansion have not been universally shared.
Most notably, the coastal provinces of Eastern and South-Eastern China have charged ahead
while the inland provinces lag behind. There is a similar, though less pronounced, disparity
between urban centers and their rural hinterlands throughout China. These regional disparities
reect not only di¤erentiated economic regional development but are further reinforced by the
continued implementation of the hukou system of household registration which restricts labor
and residential mobility.1
The large regional economic di¤erentials appear on the background of a high degree of
economic decentralization. This is highlighted by Xu (2010) who describes China as a re-
gionally decentralized authoritarian system. He points out that while the central government
controls key political appointments at all levels, it allows regional governments to run their
economic a¤airs largely unimpeded. This, he argues, is the product of political upheavals and
purges during the Great Leap Forward and, especially, in the course of the Cultural Revolu-
tion. During these upheavals, the Soviet-inspired centralized model was abandoned and instead
the regions were encouraged to compete with each other. The inter-regional competition was
aimed primarily at maximizing output but it also fostered experimentation with respect to
production arrangements and policies (such as the creation of di¤erent commune set-ups).
The result was a small (though politically powerful) central government and relatively strong
regional governments. The decentralization continued and was even reinforced during the re-
form period. Arguably, a particularly dramatic step in this direction was the creation of special
1More precisely, the hukou system divides the population into urban and rural residents, and restricts the
access of rural residents to public services including healthcare, education, pension insurance and unemployment
insurance in case they move to urban regions.
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economic zones in the early years of liberalization.2 This e¤ectively introduced a two-speed
system, allowing selected regions to charge ahead in economic liberalization while the rest of
the Chinese economy proceeded more cautiously. This appears to have laid the foundations of
the subsequent economic gaps between the coastal areas and the rest of the country.3
In this paper, we document the depth of economic integration among Chinese provinces and
analyze the factors that foster such integration. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we
use a structural VAR model to identify province-specic shocks between 1955 and 2007.4 Our
methodology allows us to distinguish between shocks that have a temporary and permanent
e¤ect on output, typically referred to as demand and supply shocks, respectively, in the relevant
literature. We compute the correlations between these shocks for all possible pairs of provinces
for four sub-periods: two before and two after the 1978 liberalization. These correlations
capture the intensity of integration, and the changes therein, among Chinas provinces, over
a period during which the country gradually abandoned central planning, state ownership as
well as Maoism and embraced economic liberalization. Second, we analyze the determinants
of these correlations using a stylized version of the gravity model (broadly in line with Artis
and Okubo, 2008, although they use a di¤erent methodology for estimating the business-
cycle correlations). In particular, we seek to explain the correlations of shocks by relating
them to factors that proxy for the vulnerability of regions to idiosyncratic developments as
well as factors that can facilitate inter-regional transmission of shocks. The latter include the
endowments of physical and human capital, transport infrastructure, structure of the economic
2On the history of SEZs and the role they have played in Chinese economic development, see Chen et al.
(2011), and the references therein.
3An especially poignant example of the fruits of this policy is Shenzhen, a city in Guandong, whose population
exploded from around 300,000 to its current 14 million since it became the rst special economic zone more
than 30 years ago.
4The use of structural VARs to assess the nature of economic integration between countries or regions was
pioneered by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) whose work was in turn motivated by the Theory of Optimum
Currency Areas (henceforth OCA; Mundell, 1961). Bayoumi and Eichengreen applied this methodology to assess
the merits of adopting the common currency in the European Union. They sought to identify which European
countries tend to encounter shocks that are predominantly symmetric or asymmetric in nature.(the OCA theory
suggests that monetary integration is less costly if it involves countries that are subject to symmetric shocks).
Since their seminal contribution, this method has become accepted as the workhorse for assessing the depth
of integration in other regions as well, see Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006), de Haan et al. (2008a), and the
references therein.
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activity, openness to foreign trade, foreign direct investment, geography, and economic policy.
We also include variables used in gravity models of trade distance between the regions and
their economic size which we interpret as proxies for inter-provincial trade. This analysis
is carried out for the same four sub-periods so as to capture the determinants of economic
integration in the various periods, and the changes therein.
Our main ndings are the following. First, the demand and supply shocks have evolved
di¤erently in the course of the Chinese reforms: demand shocks appear to become more syn-
chronized over time while supply shocks grow more dissimilar. Second, we nd that factors
that proxy for interprovincial trade and similarity in factor endowments tend to make shocks
more symmetric. Rather surprisingly, foreign trade and inward FDI have had little e¤ect on
the symmetry of shocks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briey discusses
what we know about economic integration and decentralization in China. Section 3 describes
the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 reports the main empirical nding. Section 5
states the conclusions.
2 Chinas Economics Integration
2.1 Economic Decentralization in China
During the period from the communist takeover in 1949 until 1978, the Chinese economy was
tightly regulated: output quotas, resource allocations and prices were set centrally according to
a plan formulated by the central government. This reected the initial desire of Mao Zedongs
government to follow the Soviet model of organizing the economy. However, as argued by
Xu (2010), China started to deviate from the Soviet model during the economic and political
upheavals of the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) and Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Rather
than plan and regulate the economic activity from the center, the central government granted
wide-ranging economic autonomy to the provincial governments. This was to encourage the
regions to compete with each other in order to deliver or exceed their quota of output. As a
result, China became a collection of regional economies rather than a single centrally-planned
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Soviet-type economy, with the central government in Beijing retaining control over political
appointments and decisions while devolving much of economic policy making to the provinces.
The decentralization accelerated further after Maos death in 1976.5 The objective was to
reinvigorate the stagnant economy by improving incentives and encouraging local initiative in
production (Tang, 1998). The scal and economic decentralization has been widely acknowl-
edged as one of the key drivers of the fast growth of the Chinese economy in the last three
decades. However, the decentralization has allowed some locals governments also to imple-
ment protectionist policies, ostensibly with the objective to develop their local economies (Bai,
1981).
Another important change that took place after Maos death was the liberalization of the
economy. The liberalization initiated by Deng in 1978 was gradual not only with respect to
time but also in space. In particular, the liberalization favored the development of the coastal
regions. Most notably, the central government initially directed all foreign investment to a
handful of special economic zones (SEZs), all of which were located in the costal regions (the
best well-know of which is Shenzhen, close to Hong Kong, the rst SEZ to be established in
China). In e¤ect, the SEZs were allowed to be increasingly driven by market forces while central
planning continued in the rest of the country. Following the success of the rst zones, liberal
policies were gradually extended beyond the SEZs, rst throughout the coastal provinces and
then later also throughout China. This helped stimulate the rapid development of the coastal
regions and increased their competitiveness compared to the interior (Poncet, 2005). At the
same time, the inland provinces continued to export raw materials to the coastal areas at xed
(low) prices, which translated to a net transfer of resources from the interior regions to the
manufacturing provinces on the coast. The less developed regions responded by pursuing a
policy of industrialization through import substitution, as decentralization combined with the
fact that most of tax revenue accrued from industrial production made them keen to develop
their industrial base (Lee, 1998, cited in Poncet, 2005).
An important element of the Maoist regime is the household registration (hukou) system,
5The central governments share of expenditures declined from 51 percent in 1978 to 28 percent in 1993 (Ma
and Norregaard, 1998, as cited in Poncet and Barthélemy, 2008, p.899)
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which severely restricts the ability of Chinese citizens to move and even travel within China.
Under this system, each person was tied to a particular area and could move to a di¤erent
area only with a permission of the authorities of both origin and destination regions. Despite
progressively accelerating economic liberalization, the hukou system has remained in place
even after 1978. Unlike during the Maoist period, rural workers now can move to and take
up jobs in the urban areas. However, changing their registration to the destination region is
di¢ cult. This means that they can only benet from many public services in their region of
origin: health care eligibility, childrens education and pension claims, most notably, are not
portable. Despite this, labor mobility has been steadily increasing, especially from the inland
rural to coastal urban regions (Tang, 1998).
In all, China is an economy with a single currency but capital or labor are not perfectly
mobile. Its provinces are subject to centralized political rule but are growing more and more
decentralized on the economic front.
2.2 Asymmetric Shocks in China
How well integrated is the Chinese economy? A common approach for assessing the intensity
of integration is based on examining the similarity of business cycles. Compared with other
approaches to assessing economic integration, the business-cycle approach has several advan-
tages. It not only provides a comprehensive measure of the various factors that contribute
to economic integration but it can reveal also whether there are any regional groups of the
provincial economies that are highly integrated (Tang, 1998).
A number of approaches have been utilized to assess the degree of asymmetry of shocks
across economies  whether these are countries or regions within countries. One method
is based on cross-country correlation of growth rates, ination rates, exchange rates, interest
rates and stock prices. The weakness of this method is that it does not allow one to distinguish
between the shocks themselves and the reactions to them. For example, Poncet and Barthélemy
(2008) investigate business cycles and their determinants by identifying the cyclical component
of monthly provincial gross output over 1991-2004. They nd that despite a cleavage existing
between the coastal and interior regions, business-cycle synchronization increased from a rather
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low level at the beginning of the 1990s to a level comparable to that of the US at the beginning
of the 2000s. Furthermore, they argue that international trade and local economic policy foster
synchronization. However, Carsten et al. (2010) argue that this nding may be attributable
to the specic macroeconomic environment during the period analyzed and as such it cannot
be generalized into the future.
Another popular method is to identify shocks using the structural vector auto-regressive
(SVAR) model formulated by Blachard and Quah (1989). An SVAR model allows one to
identify shocks and the economic responses to them. This method has became a popular tool
for identifying asymmetric shocks since it was applied by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) to
assess the similarities of economic cycles in Europe in the run-up to the formation of the Eu-
ropean Economic and Monetary Union (Babetskii, 2005). The SVAR methodology allows us
to distinguish between shocks that a¤ect both output and price level permanently (usually de-
noted as supply shocks) and those a¤ecting output only temporarily while having a permanent
price-level e¤ect (demand shocks). The literature studying the business-cycle synchronization
of the Chinese economy using the SVAR method remains very limited, however. Tang (1998)
adopts an SVAR model to gauge the degree of economic integration within China using data on
industrial output and the retail price index. He argues that a high degree of integration prevails
in Eastern China only. This nding is also replicated by Poncet and Barthélemy (2008).
Gerlach-Kristen (2009) uses a di¤erent methodology: she identies the common component
in output gap uctuations at the provincial level by using principal component analysis. She
nds that the degree of synchronization varies over time: it is high during the 1960s, declines
during the 1970s and 1980s and then rises again. Her results indicate, furthermore, that
business cycles in the inland provinces in Northern and Northeastern China tend to be less
inuenced by the national business cycle.
In summary, the evidence so far, as limited as it is, suggest that the Chinese provincial
business cycles have become more synchronized over time but this process has not been uniform.
In particular, a gap may be emerging between the coastal and interior regions.
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2.3 Determinants of Business-cycle Co-movements
There is no consensus as to which determinants of business-cycle co-movement are important.
There are instead many potential candidate explanations of business-cycle synchronization or
the lack thereof.
One leading candidate is trade. Frankel and Rose (1998) present empirical evidence that
higher bilateral trade between two countries leads to greater correlation of business cycles
between them. An opposite view is put forward by Krugman (1993) who argues that inter-
national trade increases specialization, making shocks more asymmetric. Frankel and Rose
(1998) argue that inter-industry and intra-industry trade play di¤erent roles in this respect.
The former reects specialization and therefore may cause asymmetries. The latter implies
that the country simultaneously exports and imports products of the same category. The total
e¤ect of trade intensity on business-cycle correlation is therefore theoretically ambiguous and
the question can only be answered empirically. Fidrmuc (2004) adopts the specication of
Frankel and Rose (1998) and applies it to a cross section of OECD countries over the last
ten years with quarterly data, controlling for intra-industry trade in his analysis. His ndings
conrm the Frankel and Rose view. Baxter and Kouparitas (2005), similarly, argue that trade
is the only factor with a robust e¤ect on business cycle synchronization. In contrast, de Haan
et al. (2008b) argue that the role of trade is less important than suggested by this literature.
Empirical evidence of the positive relationship between similarity in structure of output
and business-cycle synchronization has been stressed in a series of papers by Imbs (1998, 2003,
2004) and is found also in analyses using regional data by Kalemi-Ozcan et al.(2001) and Clark
and Wincoop (2001). Kalmemi-Ozcan et al. (2001), in particular, nd that U.S. states that
are more specialized in turn display a lower correlation of business cycles with the aggregate
U.S. growth.
Another approach, related to the trade-based link discussed above, is motivated by the
gravity model of trade. The gravity model relates bilateral trade ows to variables such as dis-
tance between regions, common language, common border, and so on. Therefore, gravity-model
variables can be, in turn, used as proxies for trade and therefore can be used as determinants of
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business-cycle synchronization: see, among others, Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Calderon
et al. (2007) and Fidrmuc (2004).
Fatás (1997) argues that the coordination of monetary and scal policies is also a key
determinant of business-cycle synchronization. Meanwhile, he points out it has an ambiguous
impact on business cycles since it depends on the type of shocks driving economic uctuations
and the ability of governments to stabilize output. If macroeconomic policies are the source of
business cycles, more coordinated policy could lead to higher synchronization. Darvas et al.
(2007) and Artis et al.(2008) investigate and conrm this based on the European Union data
while Poncet and Barthélemy (2008) and Lan and Sylwester (2010) obtain similar ndings
with Chinese regional data.
Furthermore, factor endowments are also drew attention of scholars. Most theories, such
as the Heckscher-Ohlin model, Ricardian theories and models with di¤erentiated products,
predict a signicant relationship among factor endowments and business-cycle co-movement.
3 Supply and Demand Shocks
3.1 Chinese Provincial Data
China is administratively divided into 31 regions: 22 provinces, 5 minority autonomous regions
(Tibet, Xinjiang, Guanxi, Ningxia and Inner Mongolia)6 and 4 metropolitan provinces (Beijing,
Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing). For simplicity, we refer to all of them as provinces in the
remainder of the paper. Our sample covers 28 provinces for which data are available.7 Annual
data are available for the period from 1952 to 2007. Provincial real GDP growth data and the
GDP deator are obtained from nominal and real GDP indexes published by the Bureau of
National Statistics of China8. We further subdivide the sample into three geographical regions:
6Autonomous regions are those with a high share of a particular ethnic minority: Tibetans (Tibet), Uyghurs
(Xinjiang), Zhuangs (Guangxi), Huis (Ningxia) and Mongols (Inner Mongolia). According to the Chinese
constitution, autonomous regions should enjoy more legal autonomy although this is hardly the case in practice.
7Tibet, Hainan and Chongqing are excluded due to missing data. Only very incomplete data are available for
Tibet. The data for Chongqing start only in 1997 which is when this city was split apart from Sichuan to become
the fourth metropolitan province. For the same reason, data for Sichuan consistent with its current borders are
are available only from 1978; unlike Chongqing, we include Sichuan in our analysis from 1978 onwards.
8We used the following publications: Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials 50 years of New China,
China Labour Statistical Yearbook and provincial statistical books.
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East, Center and West ; besides reecting geography, this categorization also broadly captures
the di¤erences in the degree of economic development. During the early transition period, the
coastal areas in the East were the main beneciaries of the open door policy, developing much
more quickly than the interior areas in the Center and West. Furthermore, we divide the 53
years9 covered by the data into four sub-periods: 1955-1965, 1966-1977, 1978-1991 and 1992-
2007. This break-down reects the main phases of Chinas economic and political development.
The rst two sub-periods correspond to the early and late Maoism. The early Maoist period
includes the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) while the late Maoist period overlaps with the
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Chinese economic reform was initiated in 1978 and this lead
to a dramatic economic improvement: China maintained a real GDP growth of 8-10% during
the following three decades (Xu, 2007). The reform momentum was not evenly paced, however.
Market reforms accelerated following Deng Xiaopings Southern Tourin 1992. We therefore
treat this year as the start of a new phase of Chinas reform process (see also Fleisher et al.,
2009, and Xu, 2007).
3.2 Identication of Shocks
In this subsection, we present the methodology used to identify province-specic shocks. We
use a SVAR model with two variables: the log of output (annual real GDP) and the log of
prices (annual GDP deator). It is assumed that the uctuations in these two variables result
from two types of disturbances: supply and demand shocks. This terminology is motivated
by the standard AS-AD analytical framework. Supply shocks, which are associated with the
shifts of the aggregate supply curve, lead to changes in both real output and prices in the
short and long-term. Demand shocks also have short-term e¤ects on both output and prices.
However, since the long-term aggregate supply curve is vertical, demand shocks do not have any
long-term e¤ect on the level of output and become fully absorbed by price-level adjustments.
Following Blanchard and Quah (1989), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) and Babetskii
(2005), we estimate the following SVAR model involving real output growth and price-level
growth:
9The sample that we analyze is shorter than the period covered by the data (56 years) since we use lags.
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Output and price-level are in log-di¤erences: y = logGDPt   logGDPt 1 and pt = logPt  
logPt 1. bijk are coe¢ cients, and k is the lag length. e
y
t and e
p
t are disturbances which are
assumed to be serially uncorrelated and take the following form:
eyt = c11"
D
t + c12"
S
t
ept = c21"
D
t + c22"
S
t
(2)
where "Dt and "
S
t are demand and supply disturbances, respectively. These equations state
that the unexplainable components of output growth and ination are linear combinations of
supply and demand shocks. The vector of structural disturbances, "t, can be obtained under
the following restrictions:
1: c211 + c
2
12 = V ar(e
y) = 1
2: c221 + c
2
22 = V ar(e
p) = 1
3: c11c21 + c12c22 = Cov(e
y; ep)
4:
1P
k=0
c11"
D
t k = 0
The rst three restrictions on the coe¢ cients of Equation (2) follow from the normalization
conditions and from the assumption that temporary and permanent shocks are orthogonal
(Cov("D; "S) = 0). The fourth restriction on coe¢ cients cij states that demand shocks have
no long-term impact on the level of output.
3.3 Correlations of Supply and Demand Shocks
Having estimated the demand and supply shocks a¤ecting the individual provinces, we calculate
Sij and 
D
ij , the correlation of supply/demand shocks between any two provinces i and j
during period  . If the correlation of shocks is positive, the shocks are considered to be
symmetric and if it is negative, they are considered asymmetric. Table 1 and Table 2 give
the weighted-average (with GDP used as weights) correlations of supply and demand shocks
for each province and for each sub-period, respectively. Figures 1-4 depict the distribution of
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bilateral cross correlations of supply shocks for the sub-periods 1955-65, 1966-77, 1978-91 and
1992-07. Figures 5-8 provide the same information for demand shocks. It is clear that the
nature of shocks is changing over time. However, the change is not the same for the two kinds
of shocks. The correlations of supply shocks computed for the more recent periods suggest
a lower degree of business-cycle synchronization. In contrast, the development of demand
shocks suggest a greater degree of synchronization in the later periods. Hence, depending on
which type of shocks we look at, Chinese provinces either appear to have become more closely
integrated or have grown increasingly apart since the reforms have been implemented.
The focus on the symmetry of shocks is at the core of the optimum currency area (OCA)
theory (Mundell, 1961). Indeed, Bayoumi and Eichengreens article pioneering the use of SVAR
to analyze business-cycle synchronization was motivated by Mundells theory. If shocks are
su¢ ciently symmetric, the argument goes, the regions/countries sharing the same currency
will have little need for independent monetary policy. With asymmetric shocks, policy prefer-
ences can diverge: a region hit by a negative shock would prefer loose monetary policy while
another a¤ected by a positive shock would be in favor of a monetary tightening. The OCA
theory, however, considers only the overall symmetry of shocks, without distinguishing between
demand and supply shocks. Therefore, it gives us little guidance as to how to evaluate cases
such as Chinas where falling correlation of supply shocks seems counter-balanced by increasing
symmetry of demand shocks.
Fidrmuc (2012), in contrast, formulates a model of scal integration that emphasizes the
qualitative di¤erence between permanent and temporary output shocks (recall that supply
shocks a¤ect output permanently while demand shocks only have a temporary e¤ect). He ar-
gues that symmetry of permanent shocks is more important for the stability of integration than
symmetry of temporary shocks: both kinds of shocks give rise to divergent policy preferences
but the impact of temporary shocks is (by denition) short lived while permanent shocks can
fundamentally undermine the stability of integration. In this context, the fact that China is
experiencing falling correlation of supply (permanent) shocks may come across as worrying,
despite the movement in the opposite direction by the correlation demand (temporary) shocks.
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4 Determinants of Business Cycle Co-movement in China
4.1 Methodology
So far, we have explored the changing nature of business-cycle synchronization during the last
ve decades of Chinas history. In this section, we investigate the determinants of business cycle
co-movements and, thereby, shed some light on the factors behind the di¤erent development
of supply and demand shocks discussed in the preceding section.
The dependent variables are the correlations of supply and demand shocks, Sij and 
D
ij ,
estimated for provinces i and j during period  ; with the unit of observation thus being pairs
of provinces. The correlation coe¢ cients, by construction, are bound between  1 and +1.
Besides using the simple correlations, we therefore apply the Fisher-z transformation, which
results in gures that are not bound from above or below:
z =
1
2
log
1 + ij
1  ij
Since we consider a rather large number of explanatory variables, we start by including all
variables in a broad multivariate regression. As our discussion of the determinants of business-
cycle co-movements makes clear, bilateral trade intensity, in turn, is likely to increase the
synchronization of business cycles between provinces. Data on internal trade ows in any
country, however, are notoriously di¢ cult to obtain: unlike foreign trade, internal trade ows
attract little o¢ cial scrutiny and may also be di¢ cult to measure (for instance, intra-rm
deliveries crossing provincial borders would often fail to appear in o¢ cial statistics). There is
abundant evidence in the existing literature that gravity variables explain bilateral trade very
well (see, for example, Frankel and Rose, 1998, Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006, and de Haan et
al., 2008b). We therefore include some standard and commonly-used gravity variables:
 dummy for a common border: equal to 1 for adjacent provinces,
 sameregion dummy: equal to 1 when both provinces belong to the same region,10
10As discussed above, the sample is divided to three regions, East, Center and West.
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 coast and interior-coast dummies: equal to 1 when both provinces are located in the
coastal region and when one province is on the coast while the other lies in the interior,
respectively,11
 bilateral distance calculated as the shortest distance for freight transportation by railway
in kilometers, and
 economic size, measured as the sum of the two provincial GDPs.
Regions specializing in producing similar products are likely to be exposed to similar shocks.
There is, however, no standard measure of similarity in the production structure. Following
Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Imb (2004) and Poncet and Barthélemy (2008), we compute
Krugmans (1991) absolute value index. Let Sni and Snj denote the GDP shares for industry
n in provinces i and j. Then, the dissimilarity of the two provincesproduction structures is
measured as
1
N
NX
n=1
jSni   Snj j
To compute the index, we consider 5 broad sectors of the Chinese economy: primary sector
(comprising agriculture, hunting, forestry, shing, and mining and quarrying); construction;
manufacturing; infrastructure services (transportation, post and telecommunications); and
trade services (wholesale, retail and catering).12
Another potential source of asymmetric shocks is represented by local policy making. Dis-
similarity of local policies is measured by means of two indicators. One captures the provincial
divergence of scal policy while the other investigates heterogeneity in terms of ination. Sim-
ilar to Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and Poncet and Barthélemy (2008), we use the standard
deviation of provincial budget decit di¤erentials to measure the dissimilarity of scal pol-
icy (with annual budget decits expressed as a percentages of GDP). We capture provincial
11These two dummies should reveal up whether business cycles are more closely synchronized among coast
provinces (captured by the coast dummy), between coast and interior provinces (coast-interior dummy), or
among interior provinces (omitted category).
12The data are taken from the Chinese national statistic year book.
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divergence in ination as
1
T
X
t
jGPIi;t  GPIj;tj
(see also Boyreau-Debray, 2000; and Poncet and Barthélemy, 2008), whereGPIi;t is the general
price index of the province i during the period t and T is the sub-period time span.
A major source of divergence of business cycles can be the exposure to foreign trade and
foreign direct investment. We measure the foreign trade dissimilarity as
1
T
X
t
jTradei;t   Tradej;tj
where Tradei;t correspond to the percentage share of foreign trade in GDP of province i during
period t and T is the sub-period time span. An analogous formula is used for FDI dissimilarity.
Finally, di¤erences in factor endowments can also play a role in explaining the degree of
business-cycle synchronization. We consider two factors of production: investments in human
capital and xed-assets. Investment in human capital is measured as secondary and higher
education enrolment rates (i.e. the ratio of the total secondary and higher education enrolment
to the population). Investment in physical capital is expressed as a percentage of GDP. For the
pre-1978 period, we only have public investment (private investment during this period is likely
to be very low or zero). After 1978, the data distinguish between total investment in physical
capital (including public investment) and public investment only. For the general regressions,
we include only total investment, whereas we use both types of investment in the univariate
regressions. Both investments (human and physical capital) are entered as dissimilarity indexes
computed in the same way as those for production structures, ination and trade discussed
above.
Thus, we estimate the following regressions for correlation of supply or demand shocks
between the regions
k;fij = Xij
k;f + k;fij (3)
The dependent variable is either the standard correlation of supply and demand shocks
(k = S;D) or its Fisher-z transformation (superscript f = c; z, denoting the two alternative
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denitions of business cycle synchronization). X is the vector of all explanatory variables
discussed above with the corresponding coe¢ cient vector, . We estimate four cross-sectional
regressions for business cycle similarity between regions i and j in sub-period  identied in
the previous section. We start by including all variables in a broad multivariate regression.
Alternatively, we consider separate relationships between correlation of shocks and the various
potential determinants, one single explanatory variable at a time. We report robust standard
errors using the White (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity of the residuals, .
4.2 Empirical Results
Tables 4 to 7 present the general regression results (with all variables) for each sub-period.
For comparison, regression results are reported both for the correlations of shocks and their
Fisher-z transformations. Table 4 reports on the correlations of supply shocks during the
Maoist period while Table 5 covers the reform period.
The main nding concerning supply shocks during the Maoist period (Table 4) is that hardly
any of the variables explain the interprovincial correlations of supply shocks in China. The
overall explanatory power of the regressions estimated for this period is extremely low and,
in fact, only the second regression (with Fisher z transformation for 1955-65) is signicant
(with the joint F test just barely signicant at the 5% level). The only gravity variable
that appears to play any role is the dummy for coastal regions in 1955-65 and its sign goes
against our expectations: provinces located along the coast display lower symmetry of shocks.
The dissimilarity in investment in physical capital lowers the correlation of supply shocks,
signicantly so during the early part of the Maoist period. Overall, economic determinants
seem to matter little for business cycle synchronization during the Maoist era.
The picture becomes clearer during the reform period (Table 5). Adjacent regions and
those located on the coast display higher correlations of supply shocks (however, the common-
border dummy is only signicant during the 1992-07 period). The dissimilarity in investment
in physical capital continues to lower the correlation of supply shocks during both sub-periods,
in line with expectations: regions with di¤erent patterns of investment have their business
cycles less closely synchronized.
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The regressions results for the correlations of demand shocks are presented in Tables 6-7.
Again, essentially none of the included variables explain the correlations of shocks during the
early Maoist period (and again, the regressions for this period are not jointly signicant). Dur-
ing the later Maoist period, 1966-77, we see that the correlation of shocks falls with distance and
also with dissimilarity in investment in physical capital. Much clearer picture again emerges
during the reform period, especially the early sub-period, 1978-91. The degree of correlation
of demand shocks again falls with distance (more so during the early reform period). Regions
located on the coast tend to encounter similar shocks during the early reform period. How-
ever, this is counterbalanced by the negative coe¢ cient estimated for the same-region dummy
during the same period. This surprising result may reect a dichotomy between the regional
centers and their surrounding rural areas. Economic size appears to lower the symmetry of
shocks during the early reform period: two relatively large provinces would be expected to
display a lower degree of symmetry of demand shocks than two small provinces. Dissimilarity
of investment in physical capital, counterintuitively, reverses sign for the late reform period,
1992-07, so that regions that have dissimilar investments appear to encounter shocks that are
more similar.
Several variables are notable for being consistently insignicant: dissimilarity indexes with
respect to the output structures, exposure to trade and incoming FDI apparent to have no
impact on the symmetry of supply or demand shocks. This is somewhat surprising, especially
for trade and FDI, given the extraordinary importance of external economic relations for the
post-1978 economic development (Huang, 2011, for example, nds that exposure to FDI is an
important determinant of economic growth of Chinese regions). A possible explanation of this
absence is that the shocks attributable to foreign trade and FDI a¤ect much of China in much
the same way (or else that their e¤ects quickly spillover across regions).
Some of the variables included in the preceding regressions are likely to be collinear with
each other and this could explain their low signicance. Therefore, in Tables 8-11, we report
the results of univariate regressions between the correlations of supply and demand shocks,
respectively, and each variable considered in our study. Few explanatory variables appear
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signicant during the Maoist period again: for supply shocks during both sub-periods and
during the early Maoist period for demand shocks. Nevertheless, common border, distance and
output size shape the correlation of demand shocks during the late Maoist period: demand
shocks become less symmetric with distance while their similarity is higher for adjacent and
for larger provinces. Provinces sharing a border, located in the same region and those on
the coast also appear more similar during the reform period (though the coe¢ cients are not
always signicant). The e¤ect of distance is similarly negative but not always signicantly so.
Economic size is not a signicant determinant of supply shocks whereas it appears negatively
related to the correlation of demand shocks during the reform period.
5 Conclusion
The Chinese society has experienced numerous dramatic changes during the last ve decades:
the communist take-over, the upheavals of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution,
and nally economic liberalization and opening up to the outside world and the rapid growth
that this has generated. In this paper, we document the impact of these changes on the
Chinese regional economies and on the degree of economic integration among them. The
picture that our results paint is mixed: as the reforms progress, Chinese provinces encounter
increasingly symmetric demand shocks but also increasingly asymmetric supply shocks. This is
potentially worrying: supply shocks lead to permanent economic di¤erentials, unlike demand
shocks, and therefore their falling similarity may undermine the stability of Chinese economic
integration in the future. This may translate into growing economic and political tensions
in the future, especially if appropriate adjustment channels are not introduced (for example,
greater liberalization of migration between provinces). The experience of countries such as
Belgium, Spain or Czechoslovakia demonstrates the dangers that growing economic divergence
can pose serious danger for political unity of countries, especially ethnically diverse ones.
We relate the interprovincial correlations of supply and demand shocks to a broad range of
economic variables but we again obtain at best mixed results. Little explain the synchronization
of business cycles during the Maoist period, especially during its early part, 1955-65. The
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limited explanatory power of economic factors should perhaps not be surprising, given that
the Maoist period was dominated by politically-induced shocks of the Great Leap Forward
and Cultural Revolution. During the reform period, factors typically associated with bilateral
(interprovincial) trade matter, although their importance is not overwhelming. In particular,
we nd that the symmetry of both demand and supply shocks tends to fall with the distance
between provinces and rises when provinces share a border or are located in the same region.
We nd also that provinces that experience similar patterns of investment in physical capital
tend to encounter similar supply shocks. In contrast, similar patterns of investment in physical
capital tends to make demand shocks less similar, possibly because investment behavior is
itself driven by demand shocks. Hence, interprovincial trade increases the symmetry of both
demand and supply shocks while investment in physical capital has opposite e¤ects on supply
and demand shocks. Finally, and rather surprisingly, we nd little evidence that inward FDI
and foreign trade a¤ect the synchronization of demand or supply shocks, even though these
are among the main factors highlighted as drivers of the recent Chinese growth,.
Clearly, our analysis fails to account for a number of factors that can also contribute to
the on-going divergence of permanent shocks in China. Chinese provinces may specialize in
relatively narrow range of products but our data only distinguish very coarse categories of
output structure. Migration is an important channel mitigating asymmetric shocks but we do
not have any (reliable) data on this. Moreover, migration in China is still highly constrained by
the continued enforcement of the hukou system of household registration which limits mobility
of workers and their entitlement to public goods. Finally, the role of the special economic zones
may deserve closer attention as the SEZs have e¤ectively enjoyed a substantial head start over
rest of China. This, however, might require more disaggregate data than those that we have:
the SEZs typically account only for a relatively small portion of the province in which they are
located. Finally, future will show whether supply shocks a¤ecting Chinese regions will continue
to diverge or whether this trend will be reversed.
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Table 1: Weighted average supply shockss correlation by province
Region Province name 1955-1965 1966-1977 1978-1991 1992-2007
Beijing 0.61 0.54 0.41 0.26
Tianjin 0.77 0.37 0.48 0.34
EAST Shanghai 0.68 0.35 0.49 0.33
Liaoning 0.78 0.27 0.38 -0.35
Shandong 0.63 0.38 0.46 0.29
Jiangsu 0.39 0.53 0.37 0.27
Zhejiang 0.68 0.10 0.53 0.35
Fujian 0.69 0.35 0.49 0.37
Guangdong 0.65 0.35 0.38 0.41
Hebei 0.71 0.42 0.50 0.25
Shanxi 0.78 0.50 0.23 0.03
CENTRAL Inner-Mongolia 0.65 0.46 0.18 0.10
Jilin 0.73 0.49 0.35 0.33
Heilongjian 0.78 0.40 0.37 0.09
Anhui 0.48 -0.09 -0.21 0.09
Jiangxi 0.43 0.45 0.39 0.36
Henan 0.71 0.34 0.19 -0.12
Hunan 0.78 0.52 0.36 0.38
Hubei 0.72 0.48 0.37 0.16
Guangxi 0.76 0.24 0.42 0.43
Sichuan - - 0.46 0.32
Guizhou 0.82 0.35 0.29 0.08
WEST Yunnan 0.58 0.38 0.35 0.32
Shaanxi 0.78 0.36 0.39 -0.04
Gansu 0.61 0.19 0.33 0.20
Ningxia 0.56 0.32 0.25 -0.26
Qinghai 0.69 0.23 0.39 0.11
Xinjiang 0.59 0.51 0.29 0.27
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Table 2: Weighted average Demand shockss correlation by province
Region Province name 1955-1965 1966-1977 1978-1991 1992-2007
Beijing 0.01 0.05 0.43 0.60
Tianjin 0.20 0.23 0.47 0.66
EAST Shanghai 0.18 0.16 0.34 0.73
Liaoning -0.18 0.17 0.17 0.50
Shandong 0.21 0.07 0.19 0.51
Jiangsu -0.07 0.18 0.37 0.76
Zhejiang 0.26 0.08 0.41 0.75
Fujian 0.18 -0.13 0.48 0.74
Guangdong 0.18 0.10 0.37 0.66
Hebei 0.17 0.09 0.49 0.71
Shanxi 0.05 0.20 0.38 0.66
CENTRAL Inner-Mongolia 0.05 -0.02 0.44 0.79
Jilin 0.19 0.03 0.10 0.60
Heilongjian 0.11 0.30 0.20 0.75
Anhui -0.18 0.29 0.40 0.66
Jiangxi 0.21 0.14 0.45 0.66
Henan -0.07 0.29 0.37 0.72
Hunan 0.18 -0.17 0.38 0.78
Hubei 0.08 0.10 0.39 0.75
Guangxi 0.14 0.02 0.53 0.70
Sichuan - - 0.32 0.68
Guizhou 0.23 0.16 0.53 0.77
WEST Yunnan 0.16 -0.18 0.28 0.58
Shaanxi 0.14 0.22 0.26 0.67
Gansu 0.14 -0.24 0.21 0.36
Ningxia 0.16 -0.04 0.49 0.73
Qinghai 0.12 -0.10 0.37 0.71
Xinjiang -0.08 -0.15 0.38 0.68
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Table 3: Sub-groups
Sample Observations
East
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, Shandong,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan
Central
Hebei, Shanxi, Inner-Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang,
Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Hubei
West
Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunan, Sichuan, Shaanxi,
Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang
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Table 4: Determinants of interprovince correlation of supply shocks: 1955-65 and 1966-77
1955-65 1966-77
ols z ols z
common border
dummy
0.045
(0.043)
0.082
(0.084)
0.014
(0.061)
0.021
(0.077)
coast dummy
-0.107
(0.047)*
-0.228
(0.092)*
-0.053
(0.067)
-0.084
(0.085)
same region
dummy
0.041
(0.032)
0.068
(0.062)
0.063
(0.049)
0.102
(0.061)
coast-interior
dummy
-0.038
(0.067)
-0.109
(0.132)
0.042
(0.096)
0.047
(0.121)
distance/1000
0.019
(0.013)
0.024
(0.025)
0.007
(0.019)
0.014
(0.024)
LogYi + LogYj
0.011
(0.016)
0.021
(0.031)
-0.002
(0.022)
0.007
(0.028)
dissimilarity of
physical capital
-0.488
(0.237)*
-0.945
(0.464)*
-0.117
(0.336)
-0.023
(0.421)
dissimilarity of
human capital
0.024
(0.017)
0.038
(0.034)
0.017
(0.048)
0.014
(0.060)
dissimilarity of
ination
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.003)
std dev of
scal decit
0.482
(0.210)*
1.069
(0.412)**
-0.858
(0.563)
-1.395
(0.706)*
constant
0.544
(0.125)**
0.695
(0.246)**
0.416
(0.210)*
0.41
(0.263)
observations 325 325 324 324
R2 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03
Figures in ( ) are standard errors. Signicance levels: ** 1%, *5%.
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher ztranformation and log(variables)
.
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Table 5: Determinants of interprovince correlation of supply shocks: 1978-91 and 1992-07
1978-91 1992-07
ols z ols z
common border
dummy
0.031
(0.048)
0.045
(0.057)
0.226
(0.068)**
0.276
(0.082)**
coast dummy
0.203
(0.060)**
0.26
(0.073)**
0.279
(0.089)**
0.356
(0.107)**
same region
dummy
-0.026
(0.037)
-0.030
(0.045)
-0.019
(0.056)
-0.031
(0.067)
coast-interior
dummy
0.005
(0.080)
0.009
(0.097)
-0.224
(0.115)
-0.275
(0.137)*
distance/1000
-0.022
(0.019)
-0.031
(0.022)
0.027
(0.024)
0.035
(0.029)
LogYi + LogYj
0.003
(0.017)
-0.004
(0.020)
-0.027
(0.023)
-0.030
(0.027)
dissimilarity of
physical capital
-1.844
(0.392)**
-2.225
(0.474)**
-1.381
(0.401)**
-1.616
(0.479)**
dissimilarity of
human capital
5.009
(2.393)*
5.338
(2.887)
-2.974
(4.031)
-3.399
(4.821)
dissimilarity of
ination
0.024
(0.014)
0.030
(0.017)
0.039
(0.027)
0.047
(0.033)
std dev of
scal decit
0.844
(0.528)
1.005
(0.637)
0.542
(1.392)
0.277
(1.664)
dissimilarity of
trade
0.122
(0.188)
0.121
(0.226)
0.068
(0.077)
0.075
(0.092)
dissimilarity of
fdi
-5.742
(4.189)
-6.587
(5.054)
-0.364
(1.187)
-0.317
(1.420)
dissimilarity of
output structure
-0.081
(0.123)
-0.060
(0.148)
0.522
(0.254)*
0.618
(0.303)*
constant
0.326
(0.185)
0.457
(0.223)*
0.413
(0.339)
0.460
(0.406)
observations 378 378 378 378
R2 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.11
Figures in ( ) are standard errors. Signicance levels: ** 1%, *5%.
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher ztranformation and log(variables)
.
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Table 6: Determinants of interprovince correlation of demand shocks: 1955-65 and 1966-77
1955-65 1966-77
ols z ols z
common border
dummy
0.020
(0.080)
0.018
(0.092)
0.061
(0.071)
0.064
(0.080)
coast dummy
0.116
(0.087)
0.140
(0.100)
-0.045
(0.078)
-0.061
(0.089)
same region
dummy
-0.047
(0.059)
-0.055
(0.068)
0.011
(0.056)
0.019
(0.064)
coast-interior
dummy
-0.021
(0.125)
-0.033
(0.144)
-0.159
(0.111)
-0.177
(0.126)
distance/1000
0.005
(0.024)
0.006
(0.028)
-0.089
(0.022)**
-0.096
(0.025)**
LogYi + LogYj
-0.053
(0.029)
-0.061
(0.034)
0.009
(0.026)
0.011
(0.029)
dissimilarity of
physical capital
-0.604
(0.440)
-0.729
(0.509)
-0.775
(0.387)*
-0.859
(0.441)
dissimilarity of
human capital
-0.004
(0.032)
-0.006
(0.037)
0.050
(0.055)
0.052
(0.063)
dissimilarity of
ination
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.003)
std dev of
scal decit
0.331
(0.391)
0.350
(0.452)
-0.029
(0.649)
-0.126
(0.739)
constant
0.514
(0.233)*
0.599
(0.269)*
0.211
(0.242)
0.232
(0.275)
observations 325 325 324 324
R2 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.12
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels: ** 1%, * 5%.
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher ztranformation and log(variables)
.
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Table 7: Determinants of interprovince correlation of demand shocks: 1978-91 and 1992-07
1978-91 1992-07
ols z ols z
common border
dummy
-0.032
(0.047)
-0.032
(0.059)
0.020
(0.031)
0.035
(0.056)
coast dummy
0.160
(0.059)**
0.202
(0.075)**
-0.058
(0.040)
-0.088
(0.074)
same region
dummy
-0.103
(0.036)**
-0.136
(0.046)**
0.006
(0.025)
0.013
(0.046)
coast-interior
dummy
0.026
(0.079)
0.058
(0.099)
-0.098
(0.052)
-0.201
(0.095)*
distance/1000
-0.073
(0.018)**
-0.101
(0.023)**
-0.023
(0.011)*
-0.043
(0.020)*
LogYi + LogYj
-0.068
(0.016)**
-0.085
(0.020)**
0.008
(0.010)
0.010
(0.019)
dissimilarity of
physical capital
0.583
(0.384)
0.695
(0.485)
0.493
(0.180)**
0.954
(0.331)**
dissimilarity of
human capital
0.797
(2.343)
2.267
(2.958)
-2.621
(1.814)
-5.880
(3.324)
dissimilarity of
ination
0.069
(0.014)**
0.092
(0.017)**
0.024
(0.012)*
0.032
(0.023)
std dev of
scal decit
-0.489
(0.517)
-0.577
(0.653)
0.646
(0.626)
1.015
(1.148)
dissimilarity of
trade
-0.183
(0.184)
-0.196
(0.232)
-0.064
(0.035)
-0.141
(0.064)*
dissimilarity of
fdi
-1.550
(4.101)
-3.083
(5.179)
0.338
(0.534)
0.934
(0.979)
dissimilarity of
output structure
-0.072
(0.120)
-0.123
(0.152)
-0.155
(0.114)
-0.261
(0.209)
constant
1.127
(0.181)**
1.374
(0.229)**
0.593
(0.153)**
0.804
(0.280)**
observations 378 378 378 378
R2 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.08
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels: ** 1%, * 5%.
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher ztranformation and log(variables)
.
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Table 8: Univariate determinants of interprovince correlation of supply shocks, 1955-77
variables 1955  1965 1966  1977
o z o z
common border 0:028157
(0:031775)
[0:002425]
0:048582
(0:062398)
[0:001873]
0:040173
(0:044468)
[0:002520]
0:047516
(0:055910)
[0:002231]
distance/1000 0:00207
(0:0110)
[0:000110]
 0:00280
(0:02152)
[0:0001]
 0:00670
(0:0153)
[0:0005]
 0:00736
(0:01928)
[0:0005]
LogY i+LogY j 0:0134862
(0:0113243)
[0:0044]
0:0257442
(0:0222346)
[0:0041]
0:0000835
(0:0157296)
[0:00]
0:0024802
(0:0197739)
[0:00]
dissimilarity of
capital investment
 0:336200
(0:169711)
[0:012004]
 0:037162
(0:030349)
[0:004621]
 0:268362
(0:241338)
[0:003814]
0:008314
(0:024251)
[0:000364]
dissimilarity of
human capital
0:018180
(0:017182)
[0:003454]
0:032628
(0:018441)
[0:009599]
0:015472
(0:047604)
[0:000328]
 0:009189
(0:021297)
[0:000578]
dissimilarity of GPI  0:000604
(0:001503)
[0:000500]
0:040185
(0:041364)
[0:002913]
 0:002502
(0:002149)
[0:004181]
 0:038544
(0:022564)
[0:008953]
dissimilarity of standard
deviation of sical decit
0:221947
(0:187832)
[0:004304]
0:049456
(0:037616)
[0:005323]
 0:810108
(0:535593)
[0:007033]
 0:087079
(0:041178)
[0:013656]
number of observations: 325 325 325 325
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
R2 in parentheses. in square brackets.
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher ztranformation and log(variables)
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Table 9: Univariate determinants of interprovince correlation of supply shocks, 1978-07
variables 1978  1991 1992  2007
o z o z
common border 0:023345
(0:037581)
[0:001025]
0:044330
(0:045354)
[0:002534]
0:130154
(0:051851)
[0:016482]
0:154216
(0:062148)
[0:016112]
same region 0:039198
(0:029714)
[0:004607]
0:056307
(0:035853)
[0:006517]
0:084523
(0:041183)
[0:011079]
0:100917
(0:049355)
[0:010997]
coast_intra 0:221088
(0:046338)
[0:057088]
0:276857
(0:055838)
[0:061369]
0:195236
(0:065587)
[0:023024]
0:257427
(0:078403)
[0:027873]
coast_interior border 0:054391
(0:070802)
[0:001567]
0:076551
(0:085488)
[0:002128]
 0:039507
(0:098507)
[0:000428]
 0:048638
(0:118047)
[0:000451]
distance/1000  0:02130
(0:01363)
[0:0065]
 0:03301
(0:01643)
[0:0106]
0:001098
(0:01902)
[0:000009]
0:00068
(0:02279)
[0:0000]
LogY i+LogY j 0:0521871

(0:0132161)
[0:0398]
0:0594767
(0:0159982)
[0:0355]
0:0207678
(0:0160028)
[0:0045]
0:0301462
(0:0191573)
[0:0065]
dissimilarity of
capital investment
 0:202189
(0:242573)
[0:001844]
 0:013527
(0:020732)
[0:001131]
 1:327728
(0:384416)
[0:030751]
 0:101748
(0:036837)
[0:019888]
dissimilarity of xed
asset investment
 1:831116
(0:348473)
[0:068412]
 0:148670
(0:029156)
[0:064679]
 0:897178
(0:330894)
[0:019177]
 0:080585
(0:040774)
[0:010282]
dissimilarity of
human capital
0:503795
(1:877101)
[0:000192]
0:015454
(0:027268)
[0:000853]
 4:272693
(3:910434)
[0:003165]
 0:051782
(0:045384)
[0:003450]
dissimilarity of GPI 0:016084
(0:012270)
[0:004549]
0:042656
(0:033941)
[0:004183]
0:041759
(0:025354)
[0:007163]
0:086882
(0:055054)
[0:006580]
dissimilarity of standard
deviation of sical decit
0:517423
(0:352769)
[0:005689]
0:021295
(0:022140)
[0:002454]
 0:731659
(1:128675)
[0:001116]
 0:054555
(0:037963)
[0:005462]
dissimilarity of
production structure
0:101360
(0:076309)
[0:004670]
0:037248
(0:027723)
[0:004778]
0:211801
(0:207825)
[0:002755]
0:025112
(0:052348)
[0:000612]
dissimilarity of FDI 2:892671
(2:466734)
[0:003644]
0:026751
(0:011721)
[0:013664]
0:179763
(0:721279)
[0:000165]
0:005275
(0:024454)
[0:000124]
dissimilarity of
international trade
0:205564
(0:106799)
[0:009757]
0:038594
(0:012968)
[0:023013]
0:046245
(0:046314)
[0:002645]
 0:005189
(0:015493)
[0:000298]
number of observations: 378 378 378 378
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels: ** 1%, * 5%.
R2 in parentheses. in square brackets.
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher ztranformation and log(variables)33
Table 10: Univariate determinants of interprovince correlation of demand shocks, 1955-77
variables 1955  1965 1966  1977
o z o z
common border 0:016038
(0:058028)
[0:000236]
0:012693
(0:067104)
[0:000111]
0:167365
(0:053691)
[0:029205]
0:179765
(0:060920)
[0:026251]
distance/1000 0:00005
(0:01999)
[0:0000]
0:000539
(0:02312)
[0:0000]
 0:10486
(0:017844)
[0:0966]
 0:113886
(0:020304)
[0:0888]
LogY i+LogY j  0:0162104
(0:0206834)
[0:0019]
 0:0168501
(0:0239214)
[0:0015]
0:055078
(0:0190059)
[0:0253]
0:059864
(0:0215544)
[0:0233]
dissimilarity of
capital investment
 0:103934
(0:311406)
[0:000345]
 0:027562
(0:032648)
[0:002202]
 1:208475
(0:288197)
[0:051627]
 0:101415
(0:026151)
[0:044490]
dissimilarity of
human capital
0:004045
(0:031397)
[0:000051]
0:003724
(0:019909)
[0:000108]
0:055264
(0:058134)
[0:002799]
 0:003252
(0:023473)
[0:000060]
dissimilarity of GPI  0:003036
(0:002737)
[0:003793]
 0:068216
(0:044347)
[0:007272]
 0:002924
(0:002630)
[0:003810]
 0:041937
(0:024890)
[0:008713]
dissimilarity of standard
deviation of sical decit
0:150066
(0:343279)
[0:000591]
 0:010881
(0:040521)
[0:000223]
 0:732635
(0:656563)
[0:003840]
 0:064897
(0:045588)
[0:006235]
number of observations: 325 325 325 325
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
R2 in parentheses. in square brackets.
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher ztranformation and log(variables)
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Table 11: Univariate determinants of interprovince correlation of demand shocks, 1978-07
variables 1978  1991 1992  2007
o z o z
common border 0:023834
(0:037145)
[0:001094]
0:046782
(0:047124)
[0:002614]
0:020040
(0:023144)
[0:001990]
0:037709
(0:042607)
[0:002079]
same region  0:023149
(0:029414)
[0:001645]
 0:031228
(0:037340)
[0:001857]
0:011592
(0:018341)
[0:001061]
0:031778
(0:033743)
[0:002353]
coast_intra  0:012962
(0:047163)
[]
 0:017831
(0:059879)
[0:000236]
 0:039961
(0:029331)
[0:004912]
 0:057588
(0:054049)
[0:003010]
coast_interior border 0:041835
(0:070004)
[0:000949]
0:092028
(0:088795)
[0:002849]
 0:068357
(0:043516)
[0:006520]
 0:146728
(0:080019)
[0:008863]
distance/1000  0:023941
(0:013464)
[0:0083]
 0:035316
(0:017068)
[0:0390]
 0:011298
(0:008408)
[0:0048]
 0:02251
(0:015472)
[0:0056]
LogY i+LogY j  0:0490265
(0:0130894)
[0:0360]
 0:0596692
(0:0166438)
[0:0331]
 0:0119099
(0:0070803)
[0:0934]
 0:0240455
(0:0130245)
[0:0090]
dissimilarity of
capital investment
0:238076
(0:239674)
[0:002617]
0:008761
(0:021549)
[0:000439]
0:389290
(0:171852)
[0:013464]
0:025987
(0:025293)
[0:002800]
dissimilarity of xed
asset investment
0:728007
(0:354885)
[0:011068]
0:031695
(0:031282)
[0:002723]
0:327238
(0:147085)
[0:012993]
0:050676
(0:027777)
[0:008774]
dissimilarity of
human capital
 1:064335
(1:854753)
[0:000875]
 0:010069
(0:028341)
[0:000336]
 2:411289
(1:731047)
[0:005134]
 0:057103
(0:030807)
[0:009055]
dissimilarity of GPI 0:040543
(0:011975)
[0:029585]
0:107509
(0:034903)
[0:024612]
0:007895
(0:011268)
[0:001304]
0:000705
(0:037600)
[0:000001]
dissimilarity of standard
deviation of sical decit
 0:786255
(0:347326)
[0:013446]
 0:057348
(0:022843)
[0:016487]
0:478487
(0:499800)
[0:002432]
0:021793
(0:025889)
[0:001881]
dissimilarity of
production structure
 0:155250
(0:075178)
[0:011215]
 0:077501
(0:028596)
[0:019160]
 0:115586
(0:092024)
[0:004178]
 0:057319
(0:035523)
[0:006877]
dissimilarity of FDI 0:493072
(2:442522)
[0:000108]
0:001729
(0:012263)
[0:000053]
 0:446336
(0:318804)
[0:005186]
 0:024001
(0:016601)
[0:005528]
dissimilarity of
international trade
 0:152044
(0:105792)
[0:005463]
 0:019970
(0:013594)
[0:005707]
 0:045081
(0:020417)
[0:012800]
 0:030514
(0:010430)
[0:022259]
number of observations: 378 378 378 378
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
R2 in parentheses. in square brackets.
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher ztranformation and log(variables)35
Figure 1: Interprovince correlation of supply shocks 1955-1965
Figure 2: Interprovince correlation of supply shocks 1966-1977
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Figure 3: Interprovince correlation of supply shocks 1978-1991
Figure 4: Interprovince correlation of supply shocks 1992-2007
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Figure 5: Interprovince correlation of demand shocks 1955-1965
Figure 6: Interprovince correlation of demand shocks 1966-1977
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Figure 7: Interprovince correlation of demand shocks 1978-1991
Figure 8: Interprovince correlation of demand shocks 1992-2007
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